Basically, a Domain Generation Algorithm is a computer program that is used to generate unique domain names for websites. There are several different types of DGAs, including dictionary and character-based algorithms. This article will examine both types, as well as some of the common malware campaigns that use DGAs.
LSTM-CapsNet
LSTM-CapsNet Domain generation algorithm combines the accuracy of a CNN with the speed of a CNN. The model is faster in making predictions, which can help detect DGA domains in real-time.
In recent years, cyberattacks have increased due to the use of command and control (C&C) servers. These servers hide behind domain names that change periodically. Some malware families require a C&C server connection to complete their attack.
In order to identify malicious domains, it is necessary to apply machine learning techniques. Among deep learning techniques, convolutional neural networks and recurrent neural networks are known for their effectiveness. These methods have a wide variety of uses in cybersecurity, including DGA detection. However, these methods differ in their underlying deep learning models. This paper will compare three of the most popular deep learning models, including LSTM, CNN, and CapsNet.
LSTM is a type of recurrent neural network. It uses a multi-step process to calculate the hidden state vector. It is suitable for time series data. In addition, the model learns only in the forward direction. This means it cannot guarantee that the learned features will be valid for distinguishing DGAs.
CapsNet is a new type of neural network architecture. It replaces the conventional pooling layers with capsule layers. Each capsule is composed of eight filters. Each filter is applied to a subset of the filters in the conventional convolutional layer. These filters are weighted by similar magnitude and orientation. They are then recalculated using a non-linear weighting function called squashing.
The CapsNet model is faster and more accurate than the LSTM model. The model also performed better in the novel DGA experiment, which shows the importance of combining speed and accuracy in DGA domain detection. It had the highest average accuracy and F1-score across all DGA types. It also had the second-best performance in the partial AUC metric.
A second RNN is a bidirectional LSTM unit. It also learns in the backward direction, which means it can partially process temporal information. Lastly, the sequence capsule network uses a k-means algorithm to cluster vector features.
The results show that the combination of CNN and LSTM performed very well. The model was able to predict the Vawtrak class ratio of 0.7540 with a false positive rate of 0.1740.
Character-based DGAs
Detecting Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) is an important cybersecurity problem. DGAs are commonly used to launch a number of malware campaigns. They are also known to be able to evade detection by security methods. However, predicting their values in advance is not possible. Luckily, researchers have attempted to devise methods for detecting DGAs using patterns. The accuracy of these techniques varies based on the type of model used and the way in which the data is embedded.
Several Machine Learning algorithms have been proposed to identify DGA domains. These include character-based LSTMs, a random word generator, and a model based on DNS requests. Although these methods have achieved success in different fields, their performance is limited compared to other methods.
A character-based DGA is the most primitive type of DGA. It generates domain names using lexical features, such as dictionary words, that have a high frequency of occurrence. While this may seem to be a good thing, it has the drawback of generating non-human readable domains.
Several deep neural networks have shown the ability to improve classification accuracy. These models rely on a feature representation generated by a hybrid neural network that takes into account contextual and semantic information.
Another method for identifying DGAs is to build a blacklist of malicious IP addresses. This approach is a common one, but most blacklists lack sufficient coverage of malicious domains. Moreover, they only get updated periodically. Consequently, attackers can circumvent the blacklist by continuously generating new domain names.
The domain-name-representation module uses a hybrid neural network to encode the input domain name into a character sequence. The character sequence is then processed by a sample equalization module to ensure a balance between categories. A discriminative feature representation is then fed into a softmax layer of the classifier. The RCNN-SPP algorithm achieves greater recall than LSTM, but with higher precision.
A similar method is the Typosquatting Data Feed, which analyzes domain name structure to detect DGA-generated domain names. The feed includes bulk-registered domain names that appear similar to legitimate domains.
Detecting DGAs is a complex problem. It requires a combination of statistical analysis and machine learning. BlueCat experts have used these techniques to improve their detection techniques and have made a huge leap in DGA detection.
Dictionary-based DGAs
Detecting dictionary-based domain generation algorithms is a challenging task because of their natural language characteristics. Malware variants that combine random dictionary words to form a DGA are hard to detect. They can be difficult to triage by human analysts. A single active DGA can generate hundreds of domains per day.
Common DGA detection techniques fail to detect DGAs that closely mirror legitimate domains. Deep learning architectures have been developed to improve the accuracy of the detection process. These models can be used in conjunction with generic DGA detection systems.
A generative model can be used to identify similar input domains and reduce the number of false positives. These models can also change the score of the domains they detect.
One of the most successful dictionary DGA detection models is the Bilbo model. This model uses a combination of ANN, CNN, and LSTM layers. The model is able to successfully detect dictionary DGAs and generate inline predictions. It has been applied to a large financial corporation’s SIEM. It is able to accurately classify live network logs. It has a high recall rate of more than 99.5%.
Other related work has focused on identifying dictionary-based AGDs and botnets. These models rely on an ensemble of features that are extracted from the domain names and word-level information. Several different approaches have been tested. Some have been implemented with NetFlow information from DNS traffic.
In a recent study, Woodbridge et al. implemented an LSTM network that is able to detect DGAs, and found that it outperformed character-level HMMs, entropy of character distribution, and a random forest classier.
Another related work is a community-based algorithm that uses the Smashword score to determine the likelihood that a domain name is a DGA. This technique achieves recall rates of more than 99.5%. It uses 15 domain name features including WHOIS information, the length of the domain, and the meaningful characters ratio.
The model is evaluated on its accuracy and consistency over AUC. It is evaluated on three dictionary DGA families. A test of the model’s generalisability is also conducted. The results are based on three trials.
Common malware campaigns that use DGAs
Several malware families use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to launch a multitude of malware campaigns. This makes it difficult for law enforcement to effectively monitor and shut down these botnets.
These algorithms are used in various malware families to generate new IP addresses, providing malware with new domains on demand. DGAs can generate thousands of domains per day. These domains can be used to host malicious web pages or command-and-control servers.
This technique can evade most security systems. However, DGA-fuelled malware can be spotted through reverse engineering and the use of advanced AI and Machine Learning techniques.
DGAs are used in many malware families, including the Conficker family. They are a form of malware that generates domain names that look random. The name is created from a random seed value. This means that a threat hunter cannot accurately predict the name that the malware will use.
In order to detect DGA-fueled malware, the first step is to identify the domain names it generates. This can be done by scanning DNS logs. A DGA is not easily detected by security filters, and it is also difficult to block.
Using a combination of natural language processing research and machine learning techniques, BlueCat experts have dramatically improved the ability to detect DGAs. Their techniques include ELMo, which combines artificial intelligence and machine learning to analyze patterns in DGA-fueled malware. These techniques include statistical analysis and two neural network methods.
While detecting DGA-fueled malware is important, preventing the launch of these malicious domains is the best way to protect your business. Defending against DGAs is an ongoing task. To make this difficult, attackers may change their DGAs in order to avoid detection.
The most common type of DGA is the pseudo-random generator. It is normally seeded by the system date and time. Often, a dictionary-based DGA will closely resemble a legitimate domain.
A DGA can help hackers to share malware and host phishing web pages. Cybercriminals also use DGA domains to run botnet command-and-control (C&C) servers. In a botnet, DGA-fueled malware may be used to hide the C&C server’s IP address. This makes it difficult for law enforcement to shut down the C&C server.